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LEGISLATION NOTES
STATE CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS: A PANACEA
FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT?
There has been a persistent drive in federal, state, and local government
to achieve political responsibility amongst legislators as a means of getting
a more honest and effective representative government.' Recent studies by
congressional committees, by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, by a special study group appointed by the late President Ken-
nedy, and by several state commissions and groups, illustrate the interest
of many in improving and refining the statutes pertaining to ethical stand-
ards. As a result of these studies and others, the federal government 2 and a
number of states 3 have recently enacted rather comprehensive conflict of
interest statutes or have expanded existing laws in this area. During this
period of inquiry there were numerous attempts to define a conflict of
interest; perhaps the most precise is the following:
A conflict of interest ... exists whenever a legislator or other public official
has placed himself in a position where, for some advantage gained or to be
gained for himself, he finds it difficult if not impossible to devote himself with
complete energy, loyalty, and singleness of purpose to the general public inter-
est. The advantage that he seeks is something over and above the salary, the ex-
perience, the chance to serve the people, and the public esteem that he gains
from public office.4
Advocates of new legislation feel that our present laws are inadequate and
that more intrusive methods should be implemented to preserve the pub-
lic's trust and confidence in government. 5 There is also a strong feeling
1 President John F. Kennedy recognized the urgency of this problem in a message to
Congress on Conflict of Interest, April 27, 1961: "No responsibility of government is
more fundamental than the responsibility of maintaining the highest standards of ethical
behavior by those who conduct the public business. There can be no disscnt from the
principle that all officials must act with unwavering integrity, absolute impartiality, and
complete devotion to the public interest." 17 CONG. QUAR. 918 (1961).
2 76 Stat. 1119 (1962) (amended by 78 Stat. 204 (1964), amended by 80 Stat. 249
(1966), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1966)).
3 Some of the recent state enactments are: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.092-.096, 61.990
(1962); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A § 23, (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.87-
.92 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. LEGIs. LAW §§ 80-88; TEX. REv. CIVIL STAT. ANN., art. 6252-9
(Supp. 1963); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.22 42.20.010 (Supp. 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art.
19a §§ 1-9 (1966).
4 MINNESOTA GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT, REPORT 17 (1959).
5 Extracts from THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, p. 3 (New York,
March 6, 1964); see statement by Adlai E. Stevenson III to STATE OF ILLINOIS CONFLICT OF
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amongst those proponents that greater public confidence will make serv-
ice in government more attractive.
Questions of the ethics of action in public life are not simple, and con-
flict of interest is at the heart of government ethics. With government's
increasing complexity and broader intervention into private affairs, conflict
of interest is almost inescapable,0 particularly for part-time public officials
such as legislators on the state level. Membership in most state legislatures
is not a full time occupation 7 and is not compensated on that basis. This
means that most legislators have to seek income from private sources to
support their families. It follows that some private interests either on a
small or larger scale, will likely be in some way either immediately or re-
motely affected by the policies the legislator will be asked to vote upon.
The presence of a conflict of interest does not always presume that the
official will resolve the conflict to his own personal advantage without re-
gard to the interest of the people he represents. Often times the outside
private interest proves "useful both in providing information and perspec-
tive on the problems of legislating and administering so as to secure de-
sired ends."8 For example, a legislator who is also a farmer can provide
very pertinent information in regard to legislation pertaining to agricul-
tural redevelopment. He may have been elected by constituents from his
rural farm area solely because he is a farmer and could best represent their
views. His essential responsibility is to those who elected him. The public
official would be expected to support and vote for advantageous farm legis-
lation even though he had a private interest involved.
If the restoration of public confidence, which many people think is
badly needed, is to become a reality, then it is not enough that elected
public officers of the state solely avoid the outward acts of misconduct;
INTEREST LAWS COMMISSION, p. 2 Chicago, Illinois, June 23, 1966 at which time he said:
"The conscious or unconscious subordination by public servants of the public interest
to their own economic interests probably does more to corrode public confidence in
state government than anything else."
0 See testimony by Illinois State Representative James B. Moran to STATE OF ILLINOIS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS COMMISSION, p. 1 Chicago, Illinois, June 23, 1966: "Every
legislator in a part-time legislature inevitably has conflict of interests. They cannot be
avoided." See generally Note, Conflict of Interest of State Legislators, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1209 (1963).
Extracts from THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITEE ON ETHICS, supra note 5, at 3;
see AIERBACH, GARRISON, HURSR & MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS 583 (1961); COMM. ON
AMERICAN LEGISLATURES, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N., AMERICAN STATE LEGISLA-
TURES 70-73 (1954); Regular sessions are convened biennially in thirty states and are
subject to specific time limitations in forty-four states. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1962-1963, pp. 42-43 (1962).
8 Statement by Phillip Monypenny, Professor of Political Science at the University of
Illinois, to STATE OF ILLINOIS CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS COMMISSION, p. 1, Springfield,
Illinois, June 30, 1966.
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they must also advertently avoid acts which may create an appearance of
misconduct." One prime objective of conflict of interest legislation is to
influence legislators who may otherwise be dominated by their private
economic interests to resist that domination. Appropriate legislation should
encourage legislators to assess their own motivations and positions on
measures they are asked to vote on, and prevent situations of temptation
from arising. It is naive to believe that each and every legislator is profi-
cient and expertly knowledgeable on every subject he is asked to vote
upon. Accordingly, it is also hoped that well drafted conflict of interest
legislation, with some type of provision for disclosure of interests, would
give the other legislators in the general assembly important knowledge
upon which to intelligently and objectively evaluate a legislator's position
on a measure. Being able to know another legislator's private interests be-
forehand, would help in determining how much credence should be af-
forded a fellow legislator's arguments. A final objective, but not the least
important, is to increase the public confidence in the veracity and integrity
of the legislative process. 10
SOME INNATE PROBLEMS 'WITH CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATUTES
The current body of law in Illinois relating to conflict of interest is very
complex, muddled, and disorganized. We have at least forty-six different
constitutional and statutory provisions purporting to prohibit or limit con-
flict of interests." There are more than a dozen different kinds of identi-
fiable rules with many inconsistencies in the rule governing various agen-
cies This complexity points up the confusion in the General Assembly in
trying to develop workable principles. It is doubtful that the public offi-
cial, particularly a part time legislator, reads and is conscious of all of these
laws. 12 As a result of this lack of uniformity, there remains a possibility
that the honest but unsuspecting public official may be guilty of an act
9 Extracts from THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, supra note 5, at 3;
See SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTERES' LAWS, ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 17 (1960);
See generally, Manning, The Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest, Ameri-
can Government, And Moral Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239 (1964).
10 Moran, supra note 6, at 1.
11 ILL. CONST., art. IV, §§,15, 25; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 , §§ 68.5, 88, 156; ch. 19,
264, 298, 365, 415, 469; ch. 23, § 1263; ch. 24, §§ 3-14-4, 4-8-6, 4-8-7; ch. 34,§§ 163, 193,
§§ 3306, 5106, 5135, 6024, 6208; ch. 42, §§ 331.18, 386(b), 414(d), 457; ch. 48, § 845; ch.
672, §§ 5, 70, 91.11; ch. 911, § 100-44; ch. 102, § 3; ch. 104, § 15; ch. 105, § 4-1(a), 333.3;
ch. 111i, §§ 4, 191, 332, 354; ch. 114, § 366; ch. 121, § 314(a) (49); ch. 122, §§ 22-5, 24-22.
33-5, 435.4; ch. 127, § 75; ch. 144, § 43 (1965).
12 Statement of Illinois State Representative Harold A. Katz to STATIE OF ILLINOIS CON-
FLICT OF INTEREST LAWS COMMISSION, p. 3, Springfield, Illinois, June 30, 1966: "It is naive
to expect that public officials will have even read the present laws relating to bribery and
misconduct which are scattered through 19 chapters of the Illinois Revised Statutes."
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which is disallowed by statute, where he had no actual prior knowledge as
to its illegality. This tends to dissipate the allurement of public service.
"[P]romising individuals are dissuaded from accepting government posi-
tions due to harassing or overly protective conflict of interest provisions
"13
There is concern by some authorities about the effectiveness of a statu-
tory approach to this problem.14 Many believe that public morality is basi-
cally a political problem and conflicts of interest cannot be abolished by
statutes; at best, only the evils which attends conflicts can be restrained.
This especially appears to be true where the elected part-time public official
is concerned. For example, the state legislator holds his office by virtue of
public election. If he hopes to be re-elected he must acknowledge the reali-
ties of politics, which in the American political party system includes
patronage, campaign contributions, compromise and promises designed to
produce significant group support. Large amounts of funds and group sup-
port are requisite to the operation of a successful campaign, although they
may create personal obligations producing conflicts once the candidate is
elected. Passing legislation which seeks to nullify these conflicting interests
appears extremely difficult if not impossible. How is one to know which
political necessities are ethically acceptable and which are not? Here we
would be asking legislators to pass legislation which would, so to speak, cut
off the hand that feeds them. "The line itself must be placed where it may
afford some remedy to collapses of public morality without being destruc-
tive to the system itself."'1 If such legislation was to be passed, would it
not be probable that many competent promising young men would be dis-
couraged from seeking public office because they would not otherwise
have the economic wherewithal to compete in our present political system?
Another problem which develops in drafting new conflict of interest
statutes is the construction of the legislation itself. Should conflict of in-
terest legislation be specific and detailed, and should it be an explicit statute
carrying criminal penalties defining forbidden acts with precision and
clarity? If it is to be this type of legislation its meaning must be clear,
otherwise its vagueness will make it extremely difficult to prosecute and
convict violators.' 6 An alternative formation is drawing up guidelines of
1 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION,
REPORTS 1961-1963, Vol. 12, No. 6, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, January, 1963.
14 See Davis, UNIVERSITY OF CHIcAGo LAW SCIIOOL, CONFERENCE ON CONFLICT OF
INTEREST No. 17, p. 80 (1961); See generally, Eisenberg, Conflict of Interest Situations
and Remedies, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 666 (1959).
15 Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 667, 668.
16 Davis, supra note 14, at 82: "If we remedy the vagueness and generality which char-
acterizes the existing statutes by a more specific and detailed catalogue of conflicts of
interests, may we not find ourselves ... in the position of granting absolution to all acts
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conduct in the form of a code of ethics, with the designation of some legis-
lative committee to give direction to those who are not clear as to what is
expected of them in a particular situation. Statutes may have a conglomera-
tion of these alternatives whereby they are clear with respect to some pro-
hibited actions, and set out only general guidelines in other areas.' 7
Another problem for consideration is whether the elected part-time pub-
lic official should be required to disclose his private interests, and if so, to
what degree should such disclosures be made.18 Should they be specific
(e.g. one thousand shares of American Telephone and Telegraph), or
should they be general, with a limitation on what must be disclosed? (E.g.
disclosure of interest would only be required if legislator's interest was
more than five thousand dollars. The disclosure would be general in that
the legislator would merely have to indicate that he holds an interest above
the limitation, in the field of public utilities.) Disclosure itself brings up
another question: should the legislator also be required to disclose the in-
terests of his family, and if so, which members should be included in this
category? The area of disclosure is a very difficult one because once a
disclosure is made, it may lead to unjustifiable conclusions about the pub-
lic official's connection between his possibly minor private interests and his
official actions.' 9 As shown earlier, public and private gains may occur si-
multaneously, and the existence of private gains does not in itself mean the
public interest is not being served.
PROPOSALS FOR NEW LEGISLATION
One proposal for updating and streamlining conflict of interest statutes,
deals with the question of whether the affected public official should be
forbidden from soliciting or accepting compensation, gifts, loans, travel,
entertainment and hospitality from other than the state, under circum-
stances in which it could be reasonably inferred that the gifts were in-
tended to influence, or could reasonably be expected to influence, the per-
formance of official duties or were intended as a reward for official action.
not clearly included in such a compendium? Traditional rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, those applicable to criminal statutes, and to those statutes which seem to be all-
inclusive may well give us a narrow area of prohibition, which at the same time leaves a
larger, variable and ill-defined area of improper influences cloaked in legal sanction."
17 Memorandum to Illinois State Senator Arthur R. Gottschalk, Illinois Legislative
Council, File 5-160, Some Examples of State Conflict of Interest Laws, Nov. 24, 1964.
18 Monypenny, supra note 8, at 2: "The effect of blanket disclosure provisions is to
tend to brand certain kinds of interests as illegitimate regardless of their merits and to
focus attention on the lesser aspects of matters-who will immediately selfishly benefit-
rather than upon the major question; what will the general effect of this action be, and
what do we think about it?"
1" Monypenny, supra note 8, at 2.
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The degree of control can range from absolute prohibition to no control
whatsoever. Massachusetts, New York, Washington, and Texas have taken
an absolute stand against any such action.2 0 Sometimes it is proposed that
compensation only be forbidden in connection with a particular activity,
for instance, in connection with negotiations by the state for purchase of
real estate.21 Some people advocate that a limit which would be a fairly
nominal sum, such as fifty dollars, should be set, and any gifts to legislators
in excess should be prohibited.2 2 Others advise that the practical criterion is
to prohibit gifts "of value" that might influence him, 2 3 whereby still others
would require that the official who receives a gift merely report it.
Another statutory provision to be contemplated when making proposals
involves the interest that a public official may have in a contract with a
public body where the official was in a position to influence the award of
the contract. The present Illinois law forbids such an interest on the part
of a public officer "in any contract or the performance of any work in the
making or letting of which such officer may be called upon to act or
vote. '2 4 Some of the other states in this area have enacted much broader
statutes, but at the same time they specify exclusions. For example, a re-
current form of forbidden interest is where the public servant is concerned
with a contract with a corporation in which he owns stock, but in this era
of widespread stockholding in great corporations with which most govern-
mental bodies must necessarily do business (e.g., telephone companies),
modern statutes set lower limits on the percentage of stock ownership
which is forbidden. 25 Drafters must be aware of a situation that may arise
where the state allows open bidding.2 " A legislator may have a private in-
20 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A (Supp. 1966); N. Y. LEGIs. LAW §9 80-88; WASII.
REV. CODE §§ 42.22, 42.20.010 (Supp. 1963); TEX. REV. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9
(Supp. 1963). A good example is the aforementioned Massachusetts statute § 4: "No
state employee shall . . . receive or request compensation from anyone other than the
commonwealth . . . in relation to any particular matter in which the commonwealth...
is a party or has a direct or substantial interest."
21 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.092-61.096, 61.990 (1963).
22 Stevenson, supra note 5, at 3.
23 THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ETHICAL CONDUCT, A SUGGESTED CODE OF ETHICS FOR
MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, CHICAGO, THE INTERNATIONAL Crrv MANAGERS'
ASSOCIATION, p. 21, 1962.
24 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 102 § 3 (1963).
25 The Kentucky statute says: "the holding of less than five percent of the stock
of a corporation is not considered an interest." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.096 (1963).
Massachusetts sets the exempted stock own ership in general at one percent, and New
York law uses ten percent when applying it to legislators. The Texas and Washington
Acts speak of a "controlling interest." .
26 Memorandum to Senator Arthur R. Gottschalk, supra note 17, at 6: "[T]he New
York prohibition does not apply to legislators and legislative employees where a con-
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terest in one of the companies bidding for the contract. That company
may be the one that makes the best offer to do the work at the lowest cost
without sacrificing quality. The drafters must be careful not to overlook
this possibility and thereby pass stringent legislation that would disqualify
that company from performing the work due to its ties with the public
official.
The extent to which elected public officials, such as lawyers, may prac-
tice or appear before state agencies is another area where proposed conflict
of interest legislation has arisen. Kentucky has a statute27 disallowing any
member of its General Assembly from appearing before an agency as a
paid expert witness. New York's statute28 bans any representation by a
legislator before a state agency on a contingent fee basis. These agencies
are acutely aware of their dependence on the General Assembly. State ad-
ministrators are in many respects subject to the control of the legislature,
which approves their budgets, including their salaries, and may change or
limit their jurisdiction. These agencies are therefore susceptible to the
wishes of a legislator seeking special treatment in his private capacity. Ap-
pearances by legislators before agencies of the government in behalf of
private interests does not necessarily involve the use of undue influence,
but these circumstances give an appearance malum in se which is almost as
damaging to public confidence as an actual act of bad conduct. 29 Forbid-
ding these appearances would also be useful as a prohibition against bribery
or solicitation of bribes. Some proposals3 0 do not advocate the rigid con-
trols found in the New York law. It has been proposed that legislators
should in some way be discouraged and prohibited from accepting cases
which they have reason to believe may have been offered them in an at-
tempt to gain influence over a state agency. The prohibition would also
extend to accepting cases where there is a reasonable possibility that the
agency might be improperly influenced because of participation by the
legislator. However, if the legislator honestly and reasonably believes that
the potential client should win, then he should be allowed to take the case.
The proposed method of enforcing these prohibitions would be by requir-
ing the legislators to report publicly and periodically their cases involving
tract to a State agency has been awarded 'after public notice and bidding, and it does
not apply in any event to contracts or payments for the publication of legal notices, etc.,
for which rates are fixed by law. Massachusetts has a similar exclusion that pertains to
the case of a state employee where (a) the contract was made through publicly adver-
tised competitive bidding and (b) the interests of the employee do not amount to 10
percent of the total proprietary interests in the corporation or other business entity hav-
ing the contract."
27 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.096 (1963). 28 N.Y. LEGIS. LAW §§ 80-88.
29 Extracts from THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, supra note 5, at 5.
311 Stevenson, supra note 5, at 4.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
representation before state agencies. In addition, these restrictions are to
apply to persons closely associated with legislators such as law partners. 3 1
Such proposals as these seem to lose sight of the underlying dilemma cre-
ated when the legislator is allowed to appear before the state agency. The
lack of public confidence and the opportunity for accepting bribes have
not been totally corrected by this suggestion. A dishonest legislator can
easily say that he thought his client should win.
Conflict of interest statutes 32 and proposals often include provisions for-
bidding public servants from accepting or rendering any employment or
services for private interests incompatible with their public duties. It is felt
that to allow otherwise would impair the public servants independence of
judgment while performing his official duties. Even if the public official is
of the highest integrity, the presumption of conflict continues. It appears
that by restricting some areas of outside private employment the part-time
public official is allowed to engage in, we would at the same time eliminate
a wide range of potentially talented candidates for office. The otherwise
qualified candidate may feel that his prior investment in the forbidden
private employment is too great at the time he is ready to enter part-time
public service to risk starting over again at something new. As one ob-
server recently stated, "The public has a right to choose the representatives
it wants and if their choice is not always to be wise, restricting it is a
greater evil than the abuses which may now occur. ' ' 3
Perhaps the greatest disparity in opinion on conflict of interest legisla-
tion lies in the area of disclosure. This can be seen by the varied ways in
which the Massachusetts, 3 4 New York8 5 and Washington 6 laws handle
31 Stevenson, supra note 5, at 4.
32 TEX. REV. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9 (Supp. 1963).
33 Monypenny, supra note 8, at 1.
34 The Massachusetts Act has a general provision under which any employee may ask
the Attorney General for an opinion in a situation where the facts "raise a question as to
whether the state is a party or has a direct and substantial interest" such as to bring
penalty provisions into effect. The request is to be treated as confidential, although the
final opinion is to be a matter of public record. Failure of the Attorney General to ren-
der an opinion in 30 days is to be construed as if an opinion favorable to the employee
has been rendered. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 10 (Supp. 1966).
35 The New York law requires every legislator and legislative employee to file an-
nually with the clerks of the two chambers a written statement of "each financial inter-
est, direct or indirect of himself, his spouse and his children in any activity which is
subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency and whether such interest is over or
under five thousand dollars in value, every office and directorship held by him in any
corporation, firm or enterprise which is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory
agency, [and] any other interest or relationship which he determines in his discretion
might reasonably be expected to be particularly affected by legislative action or in the
public interest should be disclosed." N.Y. LEGis. LAW § 86. Copies of these reports are
open for public inspection.
36 The Washington statute makes it optional with the head of an agency as to
whether or not officers and employees of his agency are to be required by regulation to
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the problem. For effective conflict of interest legislation, disclosure in one
form or another appears imperative. The disclosure usually relates to finan-
cial interest and business enterprises. Whose interests should be disclosed?
Should the disclosure be specific or general? Should disclosure be permis-
sive or mandatory? Should disclosure be confidential or public? Should dis-
closure be required on a continuing or periodic basis? At what time should
the disclosure be made? These are some of the many questions commissions
drafting conflict of interest laws have to face.
There is doubt by some experts3 7 as to the value of disclosures of private
economic interests only to some screening committee or board and not to
other members and the public. There is no doubt that public disclosure of
a legislator's conflicting economic interests would allow his colleagues and
the public a chance to weigh and discount his actions accordingly. There
may be more difficulty in passing legislation of this nature than if legislators
were asked to pass provisions calling for a confidential disclosure.
Some proposals 38 suggest that legislators be required to report each of
their economic interests and the interests of members of their families,
their clients subject to regulation by state agencies, and their clients with
legislative interests. What members of the family should be included in
such a proposal? Should the emancipated married son or daughter's inter-
ests, or the famous octogenarian mother's interests be included? These are
subjects of great debate and often times determines whether the proposed
legislation will pass or not. There is also difficulty in gaining general agree-
ment as to when the disclosure should be made. If the disclosure is made as
a condition precedent to voting on proposals before the legislature, there
may be occasions when the legislator may not be able to fully analyze the
bills before him to be certain that no conflict exists. Such is the case when
the legislator, in the closing days of the session, is bogged down with a
large number of bills and he must rely upon committee recommendations
with respect to many of the bills. 39
GUIDES TO ENFORCING GOVERNMENTAL BEHAVIOR
One method used to deal with the problem of remedying conflict of in-
terest provisions is to pass legislation exactly defining a conflict situation in
file with the Secretary of State a sworn statement disclosing the nature and extent of
the individual's interest in a business subject to state regulation. Such statements are to
be kept in confidence, except that they can be disclosed to members of the legislature or
to an appropriate legislative committee or to any other appropriate authority having the
power of removal of a public official or employee. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.22 (Supp.
1963).
37 Moran, supra note 6, at 2.
38 Stevenson, supra note 5, at 2; See Extracts from THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COM-
MIMfrEE ON ETHIcs, (New York), supra note 5, at 7.
39 Extracts from THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ETHIcS, supra note 5, at 7.
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a criminal statute with provisions for appropriate sanctions of imprison-
ment or fine or both.40 To some people this method is offensive in that it
may "embrace within a concept of criminality activities which may appear
evil on the surface but involve no real misconduct. '41 A fault with this
method is that it is virtually impossible to specifically define and set out
every conflict of interest situation that may arise. Therefore, legislators
may fortuitously exclude those activities that are noncognizable and which
really constitute the essence of the problem.
Enforcement of a code of ethics is another method used to remedy the
conflict of interest situation. A code of ethics is a statement of acceptable
standards of behavior for government officials and employees. It is an act
defining terms, requiring certain disclosures, defining crimes and often pre-
scribing penalties. 42 The code of ethics is a mode of communicating, in
advance, warnings and expectations to public officials, and at the same time
informing the public as to what is acceptable behavior. The code often
carries with it sanctions, such as dismissal from office, and hence may moti-
vate the individual legislator's self-examination of his position. It creates a
sense of security for the public and hopefully makes some legislators more
aware of the guidelines.
To be effective, the code of ethics requires some kind of enforcement
system that is implemented on an objective and impartial basis. A formula-
tion of a committee on ethics is most often suggested. Some states43 prefer
legislative committees to perform these functions without any outside pub-
lic indulgence or disclosure. Others 44 feel that ethics committees should
also be comprised of persons other than legislators so as to maintain im-
partiality and reduce suspicion that the charge was neither diligently inves-
tigated nor disposed of on its merits.45 Perhaps from the standpoint of
40 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127 § 75, ch. 38 § 33-1-3 (1965).
41 Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 671.
42 See State of Wash., Substitute S. 1, 39th G.A., passed April 30, 1965. See New York
City, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 1106-1.0 (1959).
4.9 In Minnesota, each house has its own committee on ethics, composed of four mem-
bers, two from each party, appointed by the leadership in the house, and in the senate,
the committee on committees for the majority party members and the minority leader
for the others.
44 In New York, each house has its committee on ethics, consisting of four legislative
members appointed by the senate temporary president or speaker, plus two advisory
members-the president of the New York state bar association and the dean of the
Albany Law School, Union University.
45 Governor Richard J. Hughes of New Jersey, in vetoing Senate Bill No. 40 (1964)
on November 17, 1964 said: "The objective of impartial enforcement can be realized
without resort to criminal penalties, but not by granting to the Legislature the executive
power to hear and determine charges against its own members in closed session, or by
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public confidence, there should be a nonpartisan, nonrepresentative corn-
mittee.
The commission selected to review the legislator's conduct may have
authority only to render an advisory opinion based on findings of fact
when a legislator has a question as to interpretation of the legislation or
otherwise needs advice as to whether a particular situation constitutes a
conflict of interest. Some people object that a conflict of interest law with
weak or no penalty provision is an incogitant action.46 They may instead
recommend direct disciplinary authority by allowing the commission to
invoke varying degrees of sanctions against violators, such as removal from
office or disqualification from voting on the bill. 47 There is controversy as
to whether the identity of the legislator before review should be made
public or remain confidential. Some people advocate making such reports
public, 48 possibly to make violators more aware of the possibility that a
large portion of his constituents may find out about his private gains. It has
been suggested that the hearings and reports by the committee remain pri-
vate unless the legislator charged with impropriety asks otherwise, and in
addition, the reports should only become public when the committee
makes adverse findings upon which disciplinary action might be based.49
Another opinion is that only after deletions have been made that are nec-
essary to prevent disclosure of the identity of the official, should opinions
be published. 50
The committee on ethics may be assigned the power to receive and con-
sider complaints concerning alleged violations, investigate complaints and
hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, render decisions, recommend action to
the general assembly or deliver its findings to the attorney general for civil
leaving accusations against State officers and employees exclusively to internal depart-
mental disposition.... No man should be asked to act as his own judge.
"[P]ublic attention to the subject of conflicts of interest long has been focused pri-
marily upon the activities of the Legislature. In order to assure the confidence of our
citizens in their government, it is imperative that no suspicion concerning the bona tides
of the Legislature be given a basis for existence .... If Senate Bill No. 40 were approved,
it could increase rather than dispel public cynicism toward the Legislature."
46 Veto message by Governor Hughes, supra note 45.
47 Monypenny, supra note 8, at 3: "It is doubtful ... whether any such body should
have direct disciplinary powers, other than admonition in extreme cases, because the
possibility of discipline, where a difference of opinion exists between a member or a
group of members and the ethical standards group, may inhibit members from acting as
they should act in the interests of their constituents and of the public . . . [S]harp differ-
ences of opinion may exist between persons of the highest integrity."
48 Stevenson, supra note 5, at 5. 49 Moran, supra note 6, at 2.
50 Letter from Hon. Earl W. Brydges, President Pro Tempore, New York State
Senate, Albany, New York asking for support of Assembly Bill No. 32, April 22, 1966,
on file in the Office of the DePaul Law Review.
